We present a mathematical program and a pointwise approach to solving for optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) single-good auctions.
incentive compatibility

individual rationality
allocation constraints
ex-post feasibility
This program can be stated formally as follows:
Making Use of Myerson's Results
Myerson's lemma tells us that we can express the IC and IR constraints with monotonicity of the allocation rule and a particular payment rule instead:
Myerson's theorem tells us that we can replace the objective of maximizing total expected payments with the equivalent objective of maximizing total expected virtual welfare.
Analogous to the case of welfare, Myerson's results suggest a twostep process to solving for a revenue-maximizing auction:
revenue-maximizing auctions 2 1. First, design an algorithm that can find an ex-post feasible, virtualwelfare-maximizing allocation given v ∈ T.
2. If it so happens that monotonicity holds (i.e., the allocation algorithm is monotonic in values), construct truthful payments using Myerson's payment formula.
Monotonicity of the allocation function holds precisely when the virtual value function is non-decreasing in values. In turn, this property of the virtual value function holds when the underlying distribution in terms of which it is defined is so-called regular. for all i ∈ N do 3:
end for 5:
for all i * ∈ w(v ) do 8: for all v ∈ T do 14: 
